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Abstract 
 
The globalization of the garment industry has encouraged transnational companies to further 
externalize their cost of production on workers and the environment around the world. 
Producing countries are engaging in what many scholars refer to as a “race to the bottom” 
regarding global wages and labor standards as these countries compete to attract foreign 
investment. There have been many attempts to push back against the egregious effects of this 
process through anti- sweatshop campaigns, laws, codes of conduct, union activism, and most 
recently, social enterprise. While these actors have traction in some ways we have yet to see 
significant changes in the behaviour of transnational corporations. This action- research case 
study introduces the concept of the activist social enterprise that not only engages in  
commercial activity but also advances a social and/or environmental mission through 
institutional entrepreneurship practices, in this specific case fair trade. Using institutional 
entrepreneurship theory, social capital theory and cognitive frames theory this case study 
attempts to create a normative framework to understand how social enterprises can begin to 
pave the way for systemic change in the garment industry by: 
 
1. Fighting to capture and influence institutional norms and regulations of business 
behaviour.  
2. Training managers to embrace the navigation of trade-offs between economic, social 
and environmental progress. 
3. Leverage social capital to develop a radical mainstreaming distribution strategy when 
competing with traditional corporations. 
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Foreword  
 
My plan of study began with the following paragraph:  
 
“My aim in this program is to explore the qualities that foster an environment 
for transformative business strategy. When I say “transformative” I’m 
referring to strategies that transform the particular industry of that business 
for the better by invoking policy change or creating alternative systems in 
which value propositions can be made from an integrated sustainability and 
social justice position.”  
 
Little did I know at the time that the pursuit of this question would involve endless 
conversations, aggressive MBA pitch competitions, hundreds of journal articles, the 
overthrowing of a corrupt board of directors, painting devil masks in an indigenous Costa Rican 
community, dodging tuktuks in Mumbai and the bootstrapping of two interesting, albeit 
entertaining co-operative businesses. I’ve had an opportunity to think big, think small and 
everything in between along my journey to discover what it takes to create a transformational 
business. I now feel prepared to attempt to discuss this exploration to the best of my ability in 
this research paper.  
 
In order to better understand transformative businesses I have had to analyze a number of 
business strategies for sustainability and empathize with those firms in order to understand the 
ways in which they were being influenced to make decisions. I’ve studied and collaborated with 
a number of co-operatives to understand how their governance structures work and how that, in 
turn, can promote systems-changing sustainability practices. I’ve studied individuals through the 
lens of behavioral heuristics and explored the internal biases that invisibly prompt us to make 
certain choices in business and in life. I’ve explored social movements and participated actively 
in the fair trade movement to better understand how networks of strong and lose ties can 
challenge the status quo. Finally, I’ve read a number of case studies on self-proclaimed social 
enterprises and analyzed their potential for creating transformation in their industries.  
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One major limitation in the connection between my plan of study and my major research paper 
was the exploration of key performance indicators. Early on during my research I noticed that 
sustainability managers had restricted cognitive frames for which they scan, diagnose and treat 
problems. For this reason I felt that key performance indicators were not a sufficient tool for 
changing systems, as they would be limited to a narrow businesses case for sustainability. I 
instead chose to step back a bit further and look at business case thinking vs. paradoxical think, 
juxtaposing the two. I feel that in order for business to embrace systems change they must first 
embrace the paradoxes between business and society, once this is done, a broader conversation 
about KPI’s can be had. I hope that other students of business sustainability can learn from the 
lessons I’ve identified in this paper. The questions involved with systems-change are not easy to 
answer definitively, life is dynamic and ever changing, as such the limitations of this case must 
be acknowledged. The principal aim with this paper is to provide a broader range of theoretical 
frameworks that may have not otherwise been considered when looking at system-changing, 
transformative enterprises. Without further ado,  
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Introduction: Who’s to Blame? 
 
On April 24th 2013 a five-story commercial factory named Rana Plaza in Savar Upazila of Dhaka 
District, Bangladesh collapsed killing approximately 1,135 workers. (Mortimier. 2015) Collapsing 
alongside Rana Plaza that day was the institutionally acquiescent norm that large-scale apparel 
companies could purchase garments from factories with little-to-no knowledge about their health and 
safety procedures. I would like to say what followed this tragedy was a clear and progressive march 
towards a collective improvement; but instead we see a myriad of different responses. Many of these 
responses have taken the form of coalitions, which are established through networks of businesses 
and organizations that (typically) share a common vision. These coalitions then fight for who will 
control the respective institutional norms and regulations that will govern business going forward. In 
the case of the Rana Plaza there was the Accord for Building Safety in Bangladesh instituted by 
labour rights coalitions such as the Workers’ Rights Consortium, the Marquila Solidarity Network 
and a number of European businesses. In addition to this response has emerged the Alliance for 
Building Safety in Bangladesh which is advocating for self-monitoring and is being championed by 
companies like Walmart and the Gap. It is this broader business environment that is the subject of 
this major research project, particularly understanding the institutional and organizational behaviour 
of actors in relation to that environment through a unique case study.  
 
In a perfect world, if the conditions of the free market were present, then theoretically each product 
sold on our shelves would reflect a perfect cost to create it. Of course, this theory comes with a set 
of assumptions including that the supply of goods equals the demand, there are a large number of 
buyers and sellers, we have perfect information about our products with minimal to no transaction 
costs and thus no negative externalities are being imposed on any member of the value chain. (Reed. 
2015) 
 
It is evident, however, that free market principles are not perfectly present in our globalized 
economy; in fact, governments have attempted regulations like anti-trust and disclosure law to try to 
mitigate some of the fallacies of this imperfect free market. (Reed. 2015) Consumers are bombarded 
with asymmetric information and marketing schemes that exploit our inherited behavioral heuristics 
and massive oligopolies control price equilibriums. Despite some regulatory attempts, there is a 
despairing global reality in which the North is dematerializing production and shifting the 
environmental burden of resource extraction and manufacturing to the south with little added-value 
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to the producing country. (Giljum, Stefan, & Nina Eisenmenger. 2004) It has been estimated that 
20% of the world’s population is currently appropriating approximately 80% of the world’s natural 
resources. (Giljum, Stefan, & Nina Eisenmenger. 2004) Furthermore, as business has been able to 
circumvent regulation and exploit the capitalist free market system, we have seen a growing 
disparity in compensation for north-south links in the value chain. In 2006, share dividends paid out 
to Amancio Ortega by the parent company of Zara fashion brand was approximately 1.3 billion 
euros; simultaneously, an average garment worker in Bangladesh typically earns just over $900 
USD a year. (Oxfam, 2017) Perhaps our collective belief in the invisible hand of the market has 
subjected us to the fallacy of reification; the delusion of prescribing real world value to theoretical 
economic constructs. 
 
In the wake of the Rana Plaza, many fingers were pointed at a number of actors: the factory owner 
for not being in compliance, the companies that bought from him, the government for not setting 
proper regulations and the consumers for supporting these types of value chains. In reality it can be 
argued that we are all partially to blame; but to assume that a global manifesto to correct this market 
failure garners support from all business, civil society, consumers and governments is, in this 
author’s opinion, a fruitless task. 
 
Let’s consider for a moment that the Rana Plaza collapse was the result of a wide-spread market 
failure in the apparel industry and that the very systems that we have designed (both explicitly and 
implicitly) to govern a corporation’s behaviour (and therefore trade between nations) is truly at the 
heart of the problem. In the United States, one percent of shareholders own about two-thirds of all 
shares (these shareholders could be wealthy individuals, banks or institutions) and these 
shareholders are able to vote (weighted against how many shares they own) once a year for the 
board of directors. (Wolf. 2017) This very small population of people then decides the actions and 
outcomes for all the stakeholders that rely upon the outputs of the corporation. If we are to place the 
burden of correcting market failures in the hands of corporations, then realistically, the 
responsibility truly rests in the hands of that tiny minority population of executives and 
shareholders.  
 
The problem is that this small population of people is not accountable to anyone but their (often) 
like-minded peers and their actions are becoming increasingly self-serving. (Wolf. 2017) The 
benefits of economic activity is growing for those at the top of the value chain but decreasing for 
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those at the bottom. By 2007, the top ten Canadian executives were making upwards of 444 per cent 
more than they were twelve years earlier while the average annual pay for a Canadian worker was 
in decline. (Hood. 2009) For decades, corporations have been subject to shareholder primacy, profit 
maximization and competitive cost-leadership strategies. More recently, boards have tended to 
compensate executives with stock options over cash, further incentivizing them to push for high 
quarterly returns and short-term thinking. (Hood. 2009) Any push to incorporate wealth 
redistribution or to incorporate a “true cost” throughout the value chain would likely render the 
corporation less-competitive, or reduce executive and shareholder’s personal earnings. For these 
businesses, attempting to integrate any sustainability strategy into a business model will most likely 
be vetted through a business case for sustainability. It must first be compatible with the elements of 
the business that make it competitive, successful and most importantly; profitable. This is why in 
the wake of the Rana Plaza, Walmart introduced the Alliance for Building Safety in Bangladesh 
rather than signing the legally binding. The Accord required that safety reports be made public, 
workers inside the factories would be included in the inspections and companies would be required 
to financially support the factories for repairs and renovations; none of which was found in the 
Alliance. (Oxfam. 2014) The Alliance was a much more corporate-friendly agreement that was 
compatible with Walmart’s cost-leadership strategy. It did not challenge the allocation of benefit 
along the value chain, nor did it support unionization and it maintained Walmart's executives and 
board as the chief decision making officers. Agreements like the Alliance are not capable of 
addressing what this paper defines as the heart of the matter: a system that creates and allows for 
wide-spread market failure. 
 
Emerging as an alternative to the dominant business paradigm is the social purpose business 
otherwise known as social enterprise (SE). A small segment of these SEs have purposefully 
structured themselves to incorporate a true cost along the value chain and organized in a manner 
that mitigates the harmful effects of shareholder primacy. SEs can take on for-profit structures, not-
for-profit structure or hybrid models that seek to maximize the SE’s ability to fulfill its mission. 
While the concept of SE has become very popular in recent years, the business world has yet to see 
SEs emerge as dominant players in the global economy. They are often at strategic disadvantage in 
the mainstream market-place against larger more well-established players that do not self-regulate 
to the same degree as the mission-centric SE. They also struggle to attract capital particularly in 
what is referred to as the “pioneer gap” between the ideation and the validation stages of growth. 
(Baird, Bowels & Lall. 2013) The question becomes how do SEs scale to the point where they are 
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able to challenge industries that succumb to market failure and how can they re-think competition, 
leverage social movements and attract growth capital in a manner that does not compromise their 
ability to be mission-centric? 
 
This paper will explore the case of the Green Campus Co-operative (GCC), a self-proclaimed 
activist social enterprise incubator that seeks to influence these institutional norms to advance its 
mission of fair trade. The paper will begin with two literature reviews. The first will define the 
various types of social entrepreneurship in North America and place the activist social enterprise 
within that broader context of entrepreneurship. The second literature review will define and place 
the GCC in the broader context of the co-operative’s social mission of fair trade. The third section 
of this paper explores three theoretical frameworks: institutional theory, social capital theory and 
cognitive frames theory. It will then present the case of the Green Campus Co-operative followed 
by a normative discussion on how the co-operative can utilize each of these theories to advance its 
mission of fair trade. 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
Social Enterprises 
 
Social entrepreneurship (SE) is an increasingly attractive concept both in public and academic 
spheres and as such is being taken up in different forms by several actors. Much has been discussed 
in defining a universal understanding of what a social enterprise ought to be or if a universal 
definition can (or should) be achieved. (Mari & Marti 2004; Dees, 1998; Martin & Osber. 2007) 
Much has been written about the characteristics of a successful social entrepreneur and often the 
majority of an enterprises’ success is attributed to those unique individuals. (Elkington, Hartigan. 
2008, Bornstein, Davis. 2010. Dees. 1998) All of the definitions acknowledge that the social 
entrepreneur must capture value (earn income) and simultaneously create some form of additional 
value (typically referred to as social and / or environmental value.) However, while these elements 
are central to any definition; capturing and creating value within the broader business environment 
can often be paradoxical in nature as the market logics of maximizing efficiencies do not always 
work in harmony with maximizing social or environmental value. (Dees. 1998) As a result, some 
researchers have suggested that market disciplines will not always effectively assess the successful 
utility of resource-use by the SE and that an alternative approach to determining things such as 
enterprise risk will also need to be developed. (Dees. 1998) 
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In the previous chapter it was mentioned that some social enterprises have purposefully structured 
themselves to incorporate a true cost along the value chain and organize in a manner that mitigates 
the harmful effects of shareholder primacy. It is for this reason that this section will go on to 
describe the vast spectrum of business involvement in sustainability and define with more clarity as 
to why the social enterprise model can be used to course correct market failure through activist 
social entrepreneurship.  
 
Hybrid Business Models 
 
 Kim Alter in her Social Enterprise Typology describes enterprises along two spectra, the first she 
refers to as a Hybrid Spectrum.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Alter Social Enterprise Typology. 2007 
Traditional nonprofits rely solely on donor dollars and government funding to operate. They also 
have a voluntary board of directors whose values are typically connected to the nonprofits core 
mission. They can take the form of a charity or foundation (which gives them tax exemption benefits) 
or a simplified nonprofit that has restriction on the way they can generate revenue as the surplus is 
intended to be reinvested into the core mission of the organization. (Alter. 2007) As a slight 
differentiation, nonprofits with income generating activities have an integrated business whose 
revenue generation component resides under the same legal entity. The purpose of this income 
generation is either to recover costs for operational expenses, services or to provide unrestricted 
income that will be used towards fulfilling the mission of the organization. One example of this 
would be the YMCA that has both a core charitable mission and a gym service that subsidizes their 
mission fulfillment expenses. (Alter. 2007) Social enterprises can either be a department within an 
organization or their own separate legal entity. They seek to create social purpose through market-
based activities and to solve a social problem or a market failure. These entities typically use 
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business vehicles such as innovation, financial discipline and have a strategy orientation. They are 
also often under some form of social ownership that can occasionally be reflected in the legal 
structure. Me to We for example is a legally incorporate for-profit social enterprise that donates 50% 
of its revenue generation to its partner charity Free the Children. The La Siembra co-operative 
produces Fairtrade and Organic Certified chocolate and is legally incorporated as a worker co-
operative (which means that it is owned by its workers.) This co-operative seeks to both offer a 
product and fulfill their social mission of fair trade. Both cases would be examples of social 
enterprises. (Alter. 2007) Socially responsible businesses are (in some cases) willing to sacrifice 
profits to produce social good. These businesses will typically incorporate sustainability into their 
culture and their strategy. They are usually privately-owned businesses that allow a few managers to 
make high-level strategic decision and prevent mission-drift. (Alter. 2007) In contrast, corporations 
practicing social responsibility are traditional corporations that will engage in different forms of 
philanthropy; however, their core business will not divert from shareholder-primacy and profit 
maximization. They may have an isolated department or product that is socially or environmentally 
conscious, but this will be largely disconnected from the core business. Finally, traditional 
corporations fully embrace shareholder primacy and profit maximization. Social and/or 
environmental values are not taken into consideration in decision-making. (Alter. 2007) The core 
objective of a social enterprise is to address their mission with a market-based intervention and 
commercial strategy. These businesses must re-imagine their industries while simultaneously 
competing with the traditional players in that industry. (Elkington, Hartigan. 2008) This competitive 
pressure requires immense financial discipline and strategic competencies while also requiring the SE 
to step outside of the box and develop new process and procedures that optimize their ability to 
maximize their mission. Another element however must be present for the social enterprise to 
succeed at correcting market failures and that is that its commercial success and mission fulfillment 
must be achieved simultaneously.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Alter Social Enterprise Typology. 2007 
The first element of this diagram represents an embedded enterprise. In this enterprise model social 
impact and economic activities are in “lock-step,” meaning that revenue creation and mission 
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advancement are achieved simultaneously. (Alter. 2007) An integrated social enterprise exists when a 
mission is achieved by commercializing services that have a synergistic relationship to the core 
mission but may not directly advance the mission. (Alter. 2007) Finally, an external social enterprise 
is when the economic generating activity is designed to support and provide unrestricted income to 
nonprofit activities. (Alter. 2007)  
Me to We for example has grappled with two different strategies (degrees of embedded-ness) for 
revenue creation to help finance their charity, Free the Children. The first strategy is to offer products 
produced and traded fairly in the communities that they work with, providing economic 
empowerment and in-turn fulfilling their core mission; in this model the core mission is in lock step 
with the revenue generation. Me to We also however has generated revenue by licensing out their 
brand to traditional corporations like Brita and Unilever. (McKoll, Jayme & Helen, Y He. 2016)  
This would be considered external social enterprise activity as the value that is created benefits the 
brands who gets increased brand reputation and Me to We that gets licensing revenue; the core 
mission is not in lock step with their revenue creation. (Hopper. 2017)  
 
Mission Quality - TOMS shoes 
 
The quality of the mission is crucially important 
to address market failures especially as more and 
more we are seeing philanthro-capitalism models 
becoming confused with social enterprise. In 
2004 Blake Mycoskie went to Argentina and 
realized that many of the children that he was 
encountering didn’t have proper footwear. He 
was very bothered by this and as a budding social 
entrepreneur took up “providing children with 
proper footwear in Argentina” as his core 
mission. Instead of building a charity he chose to 
engage in a commercial strategy that would donate 
one pair of shoes for every pair purchased, with a 
newly formed for-profit company called TOMS 
shoes. (Mycoskie. 2012) Very quickly Blake realized that he had hit a goldmine, TOMS shoes was 
Image 1: CauseMarketing.com 
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met with incredible success, within just ten years his company valuation skyrocket to $645 million 
and was majority purchased by Bain Capital. (Stock 2014) His success came with lots of acclaim 
having demonstrated a consumer demand for more social messaging in branding. However, as time 
passed, people started to notice many flaws in the model largely revolving around issues of 
“inefficiency, economic disenfranchisement, and aid dependency.” (Reed. 2017) The first major 
issue is that children without shoes are often a symptom of a larger more systemic problem. Merely 
treating the symptom (children with no shoes) perpetuates a cycle of dependency that poor 
communities historically face when the externalized costs of producing those exact shoes are placed 
directly on them. The product economics also tell a different story; for TOMS shoes to produce their 
one for one model the company has further increased the pressure on the factory to produce that shoe 
for 50% less in order to incorporate TOMS margins and the cost of production. Their free shoe model 
also disrupted local markets for shoes that were being sold before; this created a further dependence 
on foreign agents. (Reed. 2017) Finally the commodification of the poor by presenting them as 
helpless individuals with no personal agency perpetuated negative psychological features on the 
target population. (Fanon. 1952) 
 
An SE that seeks a quality social mission will have to look beyond marketable symptoms and treat 
the underlying problems. For TOMS shoes to understand why those children didn’t have shoes and 
treating the root causes of that symptom would require TOMS to re-imagine the way a shoe company 
does business in the first place.  
 
Mergers, Acquisitions and Combating Mission Drift    
 
Although system-disrupting companies have been known to thrive and become competitive forces in 
the broader business environment their success is often met with buy-outs as they reach barriers to 
growth. Some examples of famously large buy-outs include L’Oreal acquiring the Body Shop, Coco-
Cola buying an organic juice company called Odwalla and Clorox or buying Bert’s Bees. For this 
reason, the category of social enterprise can also be changed by the evolving ownership structure of 
the enterprise. Ben and Jerry’s is a famous ice cream brand from Vermont that was opened in 1978 
by two partners Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield. The two perceived their business as “an experiment 
to see if it was possible to use the tools of business to repair society” (Edmonsdon. 2014) The two 
purchased milk from local dairy farmers, paid fair wages, used local marketers for all their branding 
and graphics and had a 5-to-1 pay ratio where the highest paid person could only make 5 times more 
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than the lowest paid person. Over time the brand was widely hailed for their unique approach to local 
economic development and the two partners enjoyed tremendous success being featured in over 
hundreds of articles branding them as the poster child for social enterprise. (Edmonsdon. 2014) The 
partners held the company privately until 1984 when they decided to do a direct public offering 
(DPO) to the public (specifically Vermont residences.) They sold shares for $10.50 with a min of 12 
shares per buyer raising a total of $750,000. The company began to increase their commitments to 
social responsibility driving profits into their mission fulfillment. By the 1990’s however, their 
financial performance started to waiver resulting in a share price drop-off of 50% from its peak as its 
distribution channels were becoming a challenge. This blood in the water began to attract a few large 
buyers including Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream and Unilever who made bids as high as $43.60 dollars a 
share, claiming that they could save the company with the assumption that if Ben and Jerry’s just 
loosened its relentless and costly grip on sustainable performance it could become an industry leader 
again. (Edmonsdon. 2014) Unilever as one of the aspiring buyers knew that Ben and Jerry needed to 
be assured that their core mission would be upheld. To comfort the partners Unilever struck an 
agreement to uphold the original board of Ben and Jerry’s by giving them 9 out of 11 seats and 
would also have to contribute 1.1 million dollars a year to the Ben and Jerry’s foundation for duration 
of 5 years among other clauses that would seek to uphold the original intent of the Ben and Jerry’s 
brand. The two companies eventually settled on a cash agreement of $326 million. (Edmonsdon. 
2014)  
 
Ben and Jerry’s have transitioned from a social enterprise with an embedded strategy into Unilever’s 
external social enterprise. This has complicated the relationship between the company and its social 
mission and the additional pressures of profit maximization and corporate culture bore down on the 
team. (Edmonsdon. 2014) Although Unilever had upheld their end of the bargain by contributing the 
decided amount to the foundation and used portions of the proceeds for social benefit, the company 
lacked the transparency it once had. (Edmonsdon. 2014) The team switched from long term 
relationships into contracts, they hired a CEO that was not recommended by the board and 
unsympathetic to their social cause, which in-turn prompted Jerry to leave the board. Unilever laid 
off several employees to cut costs and addressing complex social issues became very difficult to sell 
to the CEO as he preferred to go after low hanging fruit causes that would lead to more exposure 
with consumers. (Edmonsdon. 2014) There were attempts to cut costs and lower the quality of the ice 
cream to raise profit margins. It took several years, a number of different CEOs and a lot of 
infighting for Ben and Jerry’s to find new ways of working together and begin to reconcile the 
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paradoxical divide between them. (Edmonsdon. 2014) Some have argued that this M&A activity can 
be beneficial as it influences larger players that have considerably more purchasing power than the 
smaller SE. Unilever has rolled out ambitious environmental initiatives since the acquisition that 
some attribute that to their experience with Ben and Jerry’s. While this paper cannot conclude if this 
activity is positive or negative, the question would make for an interesting research topic for the 
future. 
 
Fair Trade 
 
Fair trade has been referred to as a “predecessor to the contemporary social entrepreneurship field” 
(Alter. 2007) As with most SE innovations, fair trade has manifested in different ways along the 
enterprise spectra of Alter’s typology. Beginning in the 1940s through to the 1960s fair trade was 
referred to as “charity trade.” It was characterized by several NGOs including the Mennonite Central 
Committee, Oxfam, and others that would sell handicrafts made by vulnerable communities as a way 
to foster small-scale regional economic development. (Reed. 2015) Perhaps not quite yet a 
movement, the whole process was minimal, inefficient, and primarily conducted through volunteer 
labour in churches. The late 1960s and 70s however witnessed global mobilization of the fair trade 
movement driven largely by newly formed alternative trade organizations like Ten Thousand 
Villages, and Tradicraft. As countries were becoming decolonized, fair trade adopted highly 
politicized “trade not aid” rhetoric. The ultimate goal of this alternative trade movement was to create 
systems that would reform the regulation of international trade.  
The primary objectives of fair trade today, (as defined in Fairtrade International’s theory of change) 
are threefold; to make trade fair, to empower small producers (via co-operatives) and workers (via 
unions) and to foster sustainable livelihoods. (Fairtrade International. 2016) It does this by providing 
producers with a minimum price that is meant to protect them from volatile commodity markets, 
offer a social premium that is meant to be used for local development projects, and encourages 
democratically-controlled producer networks (typically in the form of co-operatives) to improve their 
organizational capacity. (Reynolds and Murray. 2007)  
Despite unprecedented growth, fair trade has always been to varying degrees (and remains today) a 
highly contested arena. Academics and practitioners argue about what a fair trade value chain should 
look like (Reed. 2016, Reynolds. 2000, Fridell, Nicholls & Opal. 2005), and how the governance of 
the international fair trade system should work. (Reed & Fridell. 2009) This clash has led to a 
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polarization in fair trade discourse between what some scholars refer to as “pragmatists” and 
“radicals.” (Reynolds and Long 2009, Huybrecths. 2012) Pragmatists largely believe that increasing 
market share for Fairtrade Certified goods is the most material indicator for progressing towards 
(what the pragmatist defines as) its ultimate goal of impacting producers. (Huybrecths. 2012, 
Teather. 2006) The sheer volume of corporate participation in fair trade has greatly increased the 
market share for the movement’s products.  In the pragmatist’s scenario, the traditional corporate 
dominated value chain can remain relatively the same in which the Northern retailers hold the 
majority of the power over the southern producer.  
In contrast to this, radicals see fair trade as an alternative to traditional markets that must include 
additional non-monetized benefits to the producers such as close, long-term relationships and a 
natural proclivity towards solidarity and justice in all aspects of the business model. (Huybrecths. 
2012) Radical businesses trade through social economy value chains and often reflect the legal 
structure found within the social economy (non-profit, co-operatives, B-corp, social enterprises.) 
(Reed. 2009) In some cases ownership of the trader is also shared with the producers, as is the case 
with Divine Chocolate. (Tranchell. 2007) Perhaps the major ideological difference in the two 
perspectives is the role of regulation in trade. While most radical companies would advocate for fair 
trade standards to become a legally binding institution in the global market place, mainstream 
companies would likely advocate against it as the bulk of their business enjoys the benefits afforded 
to buyers in a liberalized free market. 
Reflected in this movement is therefore a paradox; in order to fulfil its ultimate mission of a fair and 
just trade system, business needs to (at least eventually) subscribe to the fair trade ideology. 
However, in order for fair trade to attract business to its mission it must build incentives for business 
to do so. A pressing question then becomes, how much can fair trade governance systems acquiesce 
to the institutional norms and behaviours of business before it is co-opted by the conventional global 
market? On the flip side; how much can business acquiesce to fair trade ideology before eroding its 
traditional competitive positioning in the global marketplace?  
The recent Mondelez scandal highlights the tensions in this arena. In 2009, Cadbury (parent company 
Mondelez) converted one of their dairy milk chocolate bars to fair trade. (Doherty. 2016) This 
marked not just a huge spike in both fair trade licensee revenue for Fairtrade International, cocoa 
producers and their respective licensing bodies, but also increased exposure of the fair trade brand to 
the mainstream markets. In tandem with this, the mainstreaming of fair trade through pragmatist 
corporations affected the chocolate sales of radical fair trade companies like Divine and Traidcraft 
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who are 100% committed to fair trade practices. (Davies, Tranchell. 2012) It also increased the 
dependency of fair trade governing bodies on Mondelez and other large mainstream accounts that 
make up the bulk of the licensee revenue. As licensee revenue grows, national fair trade labeling 
organizations (NFOs) budgets grow; more staff is hired, more projects are taken up. To then lose a 
single licensee that accounts for a large portion of one’s overall budget can be a devastating blow. 
This may (at least partially) explain the  Fair Trade Federation’s decision to partner with Mondelez 
when the company eventually dropped the fair trade label in 2016 to work with their in-house 
scheme, a move that spurred a small uprising through the broader fair trade movement. (Hopper. 
2018) Some authors would define this process as a co-optation of fair trade. (Reed et al. 2010; 
Fridell. 2007; Reynolds and Long 2007,)   
A bulk of the fair trade literature maintains a healthy skepticism towards mainstreaming, often 
highlighting the corporation’s limited embrace of fair trade as one facet of a larger sustainability 
strategy geared towards capturing nice markets and brand reputation. (Troulis. 2016) Less work has 
been done to strategize a resolution for this paradox. One proposed solution by Tranchell is the 
concept of “radical mainstreaming.” Tranchell identifies in her paper that consumer-citizen pressure 
on the mainstream market is still an enormous push factor to convert to fair trade. She also points out 
however that the consumer message in the mainstream is diluted to merely “paying a fair price” and 
lacks the more radicalized notions of reforming the international trade system to account for power 
inequalities as well. (Tranchell & Doherty. 2007) When large traditional corporations like Mondelez 
occupy the mainstream fair trade space they essentially hold the microphone telling the fair trade 
story to mainstream consumers. To this end, Tranchell suggests that developing radical companies 
who seek to occupy the mainstream fair trade space (not just specialty markets) can begin to affect 
the narrative of the fair trade story as received by the mainstream consumer. This will require more 
radicalized licensees to develop national distribution strategies much like the example of the La 
Siembra Co-operative whose reach throughout the Canadian market is unprecedented for a radical 
fair trade company. These strategies can, as we will discover, come with high capital costs and 
require immense expertise that can often present a challenge for smaller mission-centric social 
enterprises.  
Another under-researched, but nonetheless interesting resolution to the paradox, is the increased 
participation of civil society in the Canadian fair trade movement, particularly in its attempt to 
institutionalize fair trade procurement policies. (McHugh. 2018) Beginning in 2001 the Lancashire 
market town of Garstang UK became the first fair trade town making a formal procurement 
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commitment to purchasing fair trade goods. By 2011 there were over 1000 fair trade towns 
worldwide. (Fair Trade foundation. 2015) In Canada, the First Fair Trade Town was designated in 
2007 and the town designation process was formally institutionalized by the Canadian Fair Trade 
Network (CFTN) in 2012. (McHugh. 2018) The program has since moved on to designate campuses, 
faith groups, schools, events and workplaces. The five Fair Trade Town requirements are: (1) a fair 
trade town steering committee, (2) product availability, (3) public awareness and education, (4) 
community support and (5) political support. Each of these elements is noted as being crucial to 
systematically re-institutionalize procurement behaviours of these organizations and ensure that the 
commitment is continued beyond the longevity of the campaign. The Canadian Fair Trade movement 
has witnessed tremendous success with its campaigns program and has begun to ratchet-up these 
commitments with silver and gold designations that are been sought after by many championing 
institutions today. (CFTN. 2018)  
Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks 
 
Institutional Theory and Institutional Entrepreneurship  
 
As was mentioned in the introduction, activist social enterprises need to be able to scale in order to 
intervene in industries that have succumbed to market failure. To do that they will need to capture 
and influence the institutional norms that governs business behavior and change the competitive 
landscape to favor their missions. For us to better understand how this is possible this section will 
explore institutions and the organizational behaviours that they engage in. 
 
In their most abstract forms, institutions are the structures (sets of social relationships) that make up 
the social fabric of our societies. These structures are comprised of implicit and explicit rules that 
govern both cultural and economic social interactions. (Hodgson. 2006) As a subset, organizations 
are types of institutions, commonly understood by the presence of individuals that are “bound 
together by some common purpose to achieve certain objectives”. (North. 1994) Under this 
definition, an organization must distinguish who is a member and who is not and, in some cases, may 
involve a hierarchy of command that determines who is in charge of what. (Hodgson. 2006) For the 
purpose of this paper, a university would be considered both an organization and an institution. It is 
an organization because it has distinct members and a distinct hierarchal structure. It is also an 
institution because it has institutionalized within itself several implicit and explicit rules that govern 
and influence its members’ social interactions and their resulting decisions. 
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The interplay between organizations and institutions determines the underlying code that dictates the 
outcomes of our decisions in a globalized economy and for that reason it is a significant topic for any 
social enterprise trying to advance a mission such as fair trade. 
 
Institutional Theory 
 
Institutional theory is drawn from both organizational theory and constructionism. The theory 
suggests that social norms are constructed over time because of repetitive behavioral patterns 
(decisions, attitudes, processes) conducted by actors within organizations or institutions. These 
patterns become validated as they are institutionalized by organizations and prescribe intrinsic value 
by other organizations that adopt those behaviours through a process known as mimetic-
isomorphism. (Valente. 2017) As an example of this, one can look at Phil Knight, the CEO of Nike, 
who developed a new strategy for selling shoes in 1962. He would save by outsourcing all 
manufacturing to low cost parts of the world and pour the extra money into marketing, particularly 
through high profile celebrity endorsements. This strategy drove Nike’s profits from $60,000 in 1972 
to $49 million over a period of 10 years. (Spar. 2002) When Nike first decided to outsource all 
production only 4% of footwear in the U.S was imported, but by the early 2000s that number had 
risen to 98% (Peterson. 2014) Institutional theorists could attribute (in part) this dramatic global shift 
in shoe production to the decisions made by individuals like Phil Knight whose new lucrative model 
was adopted by competitors and new entrants. Nowadays one would find it very difficult to compete 
with a company like Nike without adopting a similar pricing and supply chain model, as the 
competitive playing field has been fundamentally changed for everyone.  
 
Mimetic-isomorphism is not, however, the only force that influences organizational behaviour. Under 
the institutional theory umbrella, there are multiple isomorphic channels of pressure that are 
constantly influencing organizational behavior. This paper will address the following three: mimetic 
(presented above), coercive and normative. (Palthe. 2014) The second channel, coercive, refers to the 
explicit and formal rules that govern organizations, typically in the form of laws. This force is 
implemented through rewards and punishments for compliance with the laws. An employer 
understands that they must pay an employee in Canada a standard minimum wage set by our 
provincial government if they want their business to be deemed legitimate and avoid penalty. 
Simultaneously an employee knows they need to show up to work on time if they want to be paid 
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that wage. Nike’s choice to patronize low costs countries has often been attributed to the fact that the 
regulatory environment in those countries is different (more flexible, cheaper, looser labour laws). 
Coercive isomorphism can also come in the form of accreditation from an outside agency; Fairtrade 
Certification would be one such example. If a company achieves Fairtrade Certification they must 
meet a specific set of standards and be able to demonstrate compliance through routine audits. If a 
company does not maintain compliance, then they lose their accreditation and potentially reputation 
among their key stakeholder groups. 
 
The third channel, normative, refers to the in implicit informal rules that govern behaviour within an 
organization. This would refer to work roles, preferred work habits, culture, standards, business 
education, curriculum and standard operating procedures. (Palthe. 2014) Employees of any given 
organization will be under constant implicit pressure to conform to the rules of their workplace. 
These pressures will vary based on the organizational logics and rules that dictate success. The 
definition of success for an NGO will be very different from that of a fortune 500 company, for 
example. 
 
Organization Fields 
 
Within the study of organizational behaviour it 
must be noted that these pressures are not 
universal, but rather, the institutional influence 
on actors within organizations have boundaries 
and those boundaries are called organizational 
fields. (Valente. 2017) Sets of institutional 
norms can be applied to some organizations 
while other similar organizations may be 
influenced by a different field with different normative, coercive and mimetic pressures. Referring to 
figure 3 (source: Hopper. 2018) we can see an example of an organization field. Each isomorphic 
sub-group represents a host of elements that, to varying degrees, influence how a firm will operate. 
Some forces may be stronger influencers as others and the dynamics between them can change 
overtime.  
 
Figure 3: Organization Field Map 
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Social Capital Theory 
 
Social enterprises (particularly one that subscribe to co-operative, fair trade and organic values and 
certification standards) can be at a natural disadvantage against large scale, traditional competitors. 
Co-operatives are restricted in their capital raising strategies as they cannot do IPOs or attract venture 
capital in the same manner as traditional corporations. Fairtrade and Organic Certifications also come 
with price differentials, particularly when a commodity price is below the fair trade price floor. This 
restricts their ability to grow quickly and to offer competitive pricing through mainstream outlets. 
One potential support measure to compensate for these disadvantages is the social enterprise’s 
perceived adeptness at building social capital through civic engagement.  
 
Social capital theory speaks to the networks, values, norms and relationships among organizations, 
individuals and groups in society that impact the levels of trust and co-operation between them. (ILO. 
2018) It also refers to the assets and resources that are generated through these networks and 
relationships. (Davies & Ryals. 2010) In their paper The Role of Social Capital in the Success of Fair 
Trade Davies and Ryals measure the benefits that are accrued by a fair trade social enterprise as a 
direct result of their network. They use three factors in their assessment, relational dimensions, 
structural dimensions and cognitive dimensions to differentiate between sources (means for social 
capital generation) and benefits (competitive advantage derived from social capital transactions). The 
relational dimension refers to the levels of trust and reciprocity between the two organizations. How 
likely is one to take advantage of the other and how well can they freely share information with one 
another? The structural dimension refers to the strength of the ties within the network and the amount 
of ties that the organization has altogether. Do the organizations have multiple overlapping touch-
points and connections to a firm? Do they have networks that can compensation for a number of 
shortcomings? Finally, the cognitive dimension refers to opportunities for shared understanding; this 
includes shared language, a share narrative, and shared organizations. (Ryals & Davies. 2010) Do the 
organizations have values or other relatable qualities to one another that can help them bond and 
build trust? 
 
Social capital is particularly predominant within fair trade, as the movement shares a set of tangible 
organizational values as demonstrated in Ryal and Davie’s research. Their paper follows three radical 
fair trade coffee importers: Cafédirect, Divine Chocolate and Equal Exchange who have achieved 
considerable market share (about 14%) in the UK against traditional corporations by mainstreaming 
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their product (competing with traditional business models rather than selling only to its niche.) (Ryals 
& Davies. 2010) The study goes on to explore the various forms of social capital employed to gain a 
competitive advantage with varying degrees of success and obstacles. Cafédirect is the largest of the 
three and the most opened to co-operating with traditional retailers, the media and distributors. Equal 
Exchange is the oldest and smallest company who has historically had the most restrictive criteria for 
who they will partner and share value with, while Divine is the youngest and has the most consistent 
year over year growth of the three. (Ryals & Davies. 2010)  
 
The relational perspective speaks to the manner in which these companies conduct themselves when 
engaging in social capital transactions. The function of building relational capital is to reduce the 
perceived risks between the two organizations and increase the likelihood of co-operation through 
mutual trust and respect. This means being consistent, easy to work with and reliable when dealing 
with potential partners or allies. Equal Exchange for example cites that while they do not have the 
resources to build sophisticated systems and analytics, they do compensate with building trust. Equal 
Exchange and Divine (two seeming competitors) freely share information regularly, thus providing 
intellectual capital, without the fear of using that information to capture each other’s markets. (Ryals 
& Davies. 2010) The study also notes however, that not being able to demonstrate operational 
capacity (e.g. not being able to fill orders, sending poor quality product, etc.) can critically undo any 
benefits that would have been derived from social capital relationship building. Therefore it is critical 
for activist social enterprise to develop their organizational competencies before attempting to build 
social capital relationships that may not be able to be fulfilled. (Ryals & Davies. 2010) 
 
The structural dimension in Davies and Ryal’s paper speak to the organizations ability to maintain a 
large number of relationships. They discovered that there is a positive correlation between the 
number of connection and the rapid growth of a firm. Divine’s strategy, for example, was to engage 
in long-term partnerships with their network members. They are partly owned by their producer co-
operative, Kuapa Kokoo and engage in co-branding opportunities with other organizations like 
Starbucks, Sainsbury, Oxfam and the Co-operative Retail Group through white-label products.1 
(Ryals & Davies. 2010) These relationships are often formalized by offering board seats to key 
partners. Cafedirect in contrast has a large number of relationships, however, prefers short-term 
service agreement to long-term commitments. They do not white label any of their products and 
instead insist on leveraging their social capital to build their own brand recognition. Finally, Equal 
                                                          
1 1 A white label product is when a company supplies the product to a partner who will then brand it under their own private label 
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Exchange strictly limited the amount of engagement they had with mainstream companies until 2004. 
Until then they worked exclusively with other fair trade co-operative businesses, resulting in the 
slowest growth of the three. (Ryals & Davies. 2010)  
 
Finally the cognitive dimension as one where shared values and understanding breed trust and 
reciprocity had varying effects amongst the three cases. Having a shared-value of development all 
three organizations connect with large NGOs such as Oxfam and Christian Aid. Equal Exchange 
found shared value with Green City and Suma Wholesalers because they both shared co-operative 
values. Divine became the exclusive supplier of Oxfam chocolate when they dropped their own in-
house brand. Costa Coffee chose to sell Cafédirect because it had brand value that was tied to their 
values. The study found that relationships, which were formed through shared understand and shared 
values, had the highest degree of resource exchange. One distinct drawback that the study did cite 
was in building relationships with traditional corporations. They noted that there is a tendency for 
traditional mainstream corporations to drop fair trade once they have been positively associated with 
it, or to limit the amount of Fairtrade Certified product lines to as little as possible. Furthermore, as 
traditional corporations enter mainstream markets with fair trade products, the comparative 
advantage of fair trade to consumers begins to erode for radical companies as their mainstream 
competitors can claim some of the value themselves. Therefore companies engaging in cognitive 
social capital generation need to be mindful about the potential consequences of certain partnerships, 
as these values alignments may not be genuinely beneficial in the long-term. (Ryals & Davies. 2010)  
 
Activist social enterprises may be at a strategic disadvantage, but in order to challenge the status quo 
of business they need to compete with it directly. Leveraging social capital is one way to bridge the 
gap between world shops and major retailers. Activist social enterprises however, need to have a 
long-term vision for their partnerships so that they do not enable a future mainstream competitor to 
capture their differentiation. (Ryals & Davies. 2010) 
 
Cognitive Frames in CSR Theory  
 
Corporate social responsibility is typically characterized as a win-win-win equilibrium between 
society, the environment and corporate objectives. Sustainability initiatives supposedly live at the 
intersection of this equilibrium. (Hahn, etal. 2010) It is often recommended in business literature that 
sustainability officers seek out these synergies between revenue generation and social and 
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environmental value, claiming that over time this will enviably produce higher financial returns in 
what is otherwise known as “the business case for sustainability.” (Hahn, etal. 2010) In contrast to 
this, in what’s understood as “trade-off situations”, financial, social and economic benefit cannot be 
achieved simultaneously. For this reason redistribution models like fair trade that essentially involve 
paying more for the same product to producers is seen as a trade-off to profit; it exists outside of the 
equilibrium. Therefore the process of developing corporate strategies for sustainability are in conflict 
with redistribution and business managers will often reject the concept unless a substitute benefit can 
be identified. Fair trade NFOs2 have often sought to reconcile this trade-off by emphasizing the brand 
value of the Fairtrade mark to potential licensees (implying that they can charge a premium for the 
product, thus off-setting the additional costs.) As mentioned earlier, large corporations will often 
purchase one SKU of Fairtrade Certified product as their commitment to sustainability to test if the 
trade-off is sufficient to create a real business case for sustainability; if it isn’t, they will likely drop 
that SKU. This rejection of trade-offs inhibits corporations from becoming a full participant in 
resolving some of the core tensions between themselves, society and the environment. It also leads to 
what Hahn refers to as a “limited analytical perspective on corporate sustainability initiatives and 
strategies” (Hahn, etal. 2010) as every decision ultimately falls victim to tunnel vision imposed by 
the boundaries of profit maximization or risk reduction.    
 
In their paper Cognitive Frames in Corporate Sustainability: Managerial Sensemaking with 
Paradoxical and Business Case Frames, Hahn, Preuss, Pinkse and Figgee explore the role of 
behavioral heuristic in management decision-making. They suggest that researchers in business 
management need to address the conflicts between business, society and the environment and take a 
more critical stance towards the win-win business cases framework for CSR. (Hahn, etal. 2014) They 
also suggest that we need to begin to develop frameworks for addressing these conflicts rather than 
pushing them to the margins. They begin with the individual in their cognitive frames theory.  
 
Cognitive frames are the filters in which information is categorized and classified in the human mind 
as a result of the proclivities that we naturally have when giving meaning to an issue or question. 
According to Hahn et al, this sense-making process produces managers whose cognitive frames 
reside somewhere between the two extremes of business case or paradoxical thinking. The business 
case manager seeks to eliminate tensions (like those mentioned above) and reduce problems to 
simplistic equations. In contrast, paradoxical frames allow managers to look at problems in their 
                                                          
2 NFO = National Fairtrade Organization (Fairtrade Canada, Fairtrade America, etc.)  
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complexity and embrace the trade-offs in order to develop a comprehensive CSR strategy and to not 
restrict activities to conflict-free solutions. In fair trade for example, a corporation will need to 
embrace the “trade-off” of a small loss at times when the commodity price for their goods is below 
the fair trade price floor. They will also need to absorb the costs of social premium (used for 
community economic development) and licensing fees (used for auditing, research and fair trade 
brand recognition purposes.)   
 
During the process of sensemaking (a manager understanding and taking action on a decision), Hahn, 
Peruss, Pinksa and Figge identify a sequence of events that transpire to reach a decision. The first is 
scanning (gathering information.) Due to the phenomena of confirmatory bias that dictates human 
beings will “selectively notice information that conforms to their cognitive frame” (Hahn, et al. 
2014), the rule of a win-win-win business case framework will manifest a narrow, albeit targeted 
scan of the problem. These thinkers will not often notice the complexity of a sustainability issue until 
regulators or competitors force it upon them. In contrast, the paradoxical thinker will take a broad 
range of issues into consideration without giving primacy to one aspect. They will also tend to take 
outside stakeholder information into consideration more often. The second process in the sequence of 
events is interpreting the information collected. Their study found that business case thinkers tended 
to have a much higher degree of confidence in their ability to solve the problem because they’ve 
limited the information received into clear cause-and-effect models. Their interpretations also tended 
to focus on aspects of sustainability that are clearly positively or negatively related to financial 
performance. The paradoxical manager will feel less control to solve the problem as they embrace the 
complexity and acknowledge tensions; as a result their analysis of a sustainability issue may not lead 
to clear plans of action that can be measured by traditional quantitative methods. The third process is 
responding, these different frames of thinking will result in different “decision making stances.” 
Business case thinkers will have a very narrow focus on one or two sustainability issues that will 
either be perceived as an opportunity or a threat for the business. These managers will also base their 
decision off of similar examples from the peers in their organizational field. These solutions will 
naturally become very pragmatic and seek to disrupt the business as little as possible. In contrast to 
this, the paradoxical manager will consider many aspects and not take a stand on the issues quickly. 
They will usually respond, not with mimetic isomorphism like the business case, but rather will seek 
out alternatives that may not have been tried yet. (Hahn, etal. 2014) 
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Paradoxical thinking in firms can bring a strong diversity of opinions and challenge narrow 
confirmatory viewpoints. In order for students of business sustainability to become trained in 
paradoxical thinking they will need to interact with more stakeholders that have diverse views from 
their own. They will also need to be trained in qualitative assessments that exist outside the paradigm 
of business case thinking and rewarded when presenting alternatives that embrace complexity and 
acknowledge the core tensions between business and society.  
 
Chapter 3: Methodology  
 
Study Rationale 
 
This action-research case study introduces the concept of the activist social enterprise that not only 
engages in commercial activity but also advances a social and/or environmental mission through 
institutional entrepreneurship practices, in this specific case fair trade. Using institutional, social 
capital and cognitive frames theories this case study attempts to create a normative framework to 
understand how SEs can begin to pave the way for systemic change in the garment industry by: 
1. Fighting to capture and influence institutional norms and regulations of business behavior. 
2. Train managers to embrace the navigation of trade-offs between economic, social and 
environmental progress.  
3. Developing dense networks of strong and lose ties that share a common vision.  
 
An action-research approach was chosen to better understand how the Green Campus Co-operative 
could leverage the tools found within the study of institutional entrepreneurship to address market 
failures found within the globalized garment industry. I have adapted the characteristics of action-
research in order to address my familiarity and participation in the project and applied them to an 
exploratory case study method. The intention of the study is to describe the Green Campus Co-
operative by analyzing how various stakeholders perceive and make sense of their experiences in 
relation to the co-operative and the broader fair trade movement. It explores what the co-op has done 
thus far and then recommends how the co-op can utilize the theoretical frameworks outlined in this 
paper as a strategy to advance a systems-change approach to the garment industry. As our case is a 
very young enterprise it cannot be determined with any significant degree of confidence whether or 
not this business has been able to enact systems-change. Rather, the purpose of this exploration is to 
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identify strategies for how the co-op could utilize the aforementioned theories to better equip them 
for systems-changing behavior.  
Selection of Site  
 
The pool of data was collected from three primary sources as they relate to our case; macro, meso 
and micro stakeholders.  
 
Macro Stakeholders Meso Stakeholders Micro Stakeholders 
The Broader Fair Trade 
Movement 
Board Members Placement Students  
University Institutions Green Campus Cooperative Downstream supply chain 
Direct Customers Staff  
 
Macro stakeholders belong to the broader business environment surrounding to co-operative, these 
individuals are considered to be prominent long-term members of the fair trade movement in Canada 
since the creation of Canada’s first NFO, TransFair Canada. They are individuals who work with 
other fair trade licensees or in the adjoining civil society organizations. Macro stakeholders also 
involve campus leaders and members of university institutions who are familiar with the rules and 
behaviours expected of business operating within a university setting. The meso stakeholders are 
those directly involved in the co-operative, including both founders as well as current and former 
board members. Micro stakeholders are the co-operatives placement students who have worked with 
the co-op to satisfy course requirements. This group is comprised entirely of undergraduate York 
University students from a variety of disciplines. Downstream supply chain interviews were 
conducted in May 2018 with the merchandise managers at the GCC’s primary supplier, Assisi 
Garments Ltd and members of the Rights, Development and  Education Center, an nonprofit, factory 
watch dog operating out of Sathyamangalam, Tamil Nadu.  
Data Collection 
 
Observation 
For two years I have been participating in the Green Campus Co-operative and in the boarder fair 
trade movement as board treasurer and one of the primary entrepreneurs trying to get the project off 
of the ground. I have used a field journal about my own interpretations of the co-operatives 
operations and connection to its external environment. I wrote down observations in a journal about 
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the assumptions that I was making about the experiences that were both confirmed and denied during 
the interview process.  
 
Interviews 
I conducted opened-ended semi-structured interviews with 15 participants from the three different 
stakeholder groups after obtaining written consent form each participant. Each stakeholder group was 
asked different sets of opened-ended questions. Most of these questions focused on an individuals’ 
experience and their opinions on various concepts. I also asked knowledge-based questions to better 
understand particular situations.   
 
Questions for macro stakeholders were designed to identify the specifics of the co-operatives 
organization field and to understand how the Green Campus Co-operative fits within that broader 
field of fair trade and the apparel industry. They were also designed to allow for a broader 
conversation about the fair trade movement and understand how they have individually navigated 
through that contested landscape.  
 
Questions for meso stakeholders sought to identify a historical recollection of the co-operative’s 
development including participants’ motivation for involvement, the types of involvement, the role 
the co-operative played in achieving their respective goals and their thoughts on how it can be 
improved.  
 
Questions for the micro stakeholders were to understand how placement students felt about their 
experiences working with the GCC, how that experience has influenced their views on business and 
fair trade, where they found value, what they believed could be improved and how they plan to use 
that experience going forward in the careers. Downstream stakeholders were asked about the current 
situation for garment workers in Tamil Nadu and what systems of recruitment and regulations of 
labour were taking place. Broader questions about audits and fair trade were also asked to begin to 
identify the value that Fairtrade Certification may or may not add to a garment supply chain.  
 
Other Methods  
I have also analyzed documents from various groups including the Canadian Fair Trade Network, 
Fairtrade Canada, Fairtrade International, the Rights Education and Development Center as well as 
past GCC marketing materials and internal documents.   
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Data Organization and Analysis   
 
The data was organized by stakeholder groups. Themes, concepts and insights from those groups 
have been deduced and embedded into the narrative of the case study. The intentions of the 
interviews were (1) to understand the lived experience of past and present GCC members from 
diverse and unique perspectives. (2) Understand the broader business environmental (organizational 
field) surrounding the GCC, and (3) to understand the experiences of the GCCs past placement 
students for the purpose of improving the program.  
(1) Data collection and analysis for the purpose of re-telling the GCC story was designed to  
objectively explain the GCCs progress. Multiple participants have a different lived experience 
of their time with the GCC, including different assumptions on what its purpose was, what its 
strategies should look like, etc. For this reason this interview processes lent itself to the 
creation of a historically re-telling that not only reflected multiple perspectives but challenged 
my own assumptions of its purpose and strategy as a participant myself.  
(2) Data collection and analysis for the purpose of understanding the broader business 
environment was intended to challenge my assumptions of how other actors perceive their 
involvement with the GCCs core mission (fair trade.) These questions were both designed to 
understand the personal connection as well as the historical series of events that lead to their 
involvement in fair trade and the concurrent successes that they have achieved in their 
respective organizations. 
(3)  Data collection and analysis for the purpose of strengthening the experiential education 
program was designed to evaluate the program’s strengths and weaknesses and to identify the 
levels of autonomy that students can tolerate during a placement. It also sought to assess the 
resulting knowledge accrued by the student and to assess if they’ve developed a deeper 
connection to the GCCs core mission of fair trade through their experience.  
 
Two initial interviews with members of each stakeholder group were recorded and selective themes 
were written down during the interview process. The researcher reflected on the themes presented 
and the interview process that took place. Upon refinement of interview questions and processes as a 
result of the reflection, additional interviews were conducted. Evolving patterns and trends were 
identified from each stakeholder group and categorized in separate written documents in which 
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conclusions were drawn and tested against a field journal of the researcher’s own personal 
experience.  
 
Limitations to Data Collection 
 
I have had a very active role in this co-operative and as such my own ideas and interpretations have 
subjected my analysis to certain cognitive biases. I may have become subject to confirmatory bias in 
which I would seek to validate my own perceptions of the world by seeking out like-minded 
information. In order to build in check and balances for this phenomena I kept a journal logging my 
assumptions and then testing them through interviews. (However, the possibility that I sought out 
self-validating information may still be present beyond my knowledge.) Another bias I may have 
encountered was group think bias through the group classwork that would evolve to become chapters 
of this MRP as Faculty and fellow members of my program likely subscribe to a similar ideology as 
myself. I made sure to take a number of MBA classes during this time when I was constructing the 
building blocks for this research project. I collaborated with many MBA students that were 
predominantly being taught traditional business school logic. This allowed me to look at the issues 
from conflicting logics, preventing me from sinking into one single cognitive frame for my sense 
making process. Group think bias may have also influenced the outcomes of many of my interviews. 
I have a high degree of familiarity with many of the participants which may have caused them to 
gloss over criticisms or concerns. There is also a power dynamic involved as a number of the 
students were under my supervision for their placements. In order to address this potential I ensured 
that all students were no longer under my supervision at the time of their interviews, I avoided stating 
my opinions or preferences and I did not voice any particular expectations of them. Finally there may 
be an element of ethno-centrism on my part as my cultural biases may inhibit my abilities to look 
objectively at some of the social norms and practices that I have encountered during my time 
interviewing in India.   
Chapter 4: The Green Campus Co-operative, a Case Study  
 
Darryl Reed is not your typical professor, in many ways he is an activist trapped in a professor’s 
office. Heavily influenced by Greg MacLeod from Cape Breton University and their shared loved for 
praxis, he has turned any and all opportunities for research funding into a slew of start-up co-
operative business models, each geared towards solving complex social and environmental problems. 
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Darryl, along with his colleagues at the GCC, have long grappled with the balance between providing 
experiential education, producing academic research and creating business solutions for real world 
problems, all under the organizational umbrella of a co-operative model. After many attempts, the 
co-op was able to develop their first business in partnership with two other corporate members; the 
York University Faculty Association and the Graduate Students Association. The second business 
(and main focus of this case study) is a sustainable garment company (Green Campus Cotton) that 
champions Fairtrade and Organic Certification standards. The complexity of the typical global 
garment supply chain has produced tremendous inertia around supply chain reform. Having written 
many research papers on fair trade value chains, Darryl was well aware that corporations were not 
likely to subscribe to redistribution models like fair trade in a manner that could mitigate the harm 
done by neoliberal free trade. The co-operative however, found itself in a unique position to 
experiment with an activist social enterprise business model because it is able to leverage academic, 
financial and operational support from the university it resides within. In addition to this they also 
had access to an established network of campus activists3 that have built an impressively large 
movement around the co-op’s primary missions of fair trade standards. For these reasons, Darryl 
decided that it was time to dive into the world of cotton. 
What is Green Campus Cotton Trying to Address: The Current Situation in the Indian Garment 
Industry 
 
Anjali4 feel asleep in the middle of her shift working at a local spinning mill in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu. 
She had decided to work at the mill to help pay her father’s medical bills as her family had been 
living in poverty much like the rest of her rural village and could not otherwise afford the treatments 
her father needed. She had just worked for three days non-stop when she was awoken to a pick axe 
handle colliding with her chest followed by an attempted sexual assault by the factory foreman. She 
escaped the next morning and returned home devastated5 to a concerned family that was told she 
would be protected under her contract. (Wishing Step Productions. 2017) This is but one of 
thousands of testimonials by women and girls working along the modern day garments supply chain.  
 
The Indian textile industry is the largest contributor of exports (13% of total) and the largest 
employer in the country. (IBEF. 2018) Garment manufacturing involves a number of decentralized 
processes including cotton production, ginning, spinning, weaving/knitting, dying, printing, 
                                                          
3 This network is the participants in the Fair Trade Campus designation program run by the Canadian Fair Trade Network 
4 Name changed for confidentiality 
5 Retelling for a Wishing Step Production documentary, filmed at READ in Sathyamangalam 
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embroidery, cut and trim, tagging/packing and exporting. (Reed. 2012). Although there is ample 
opportunity for employment and innovation in this space, the globalization of production in garments 
has completely transformed the nature of its trade into one that is often characterized by “very 
flexible and casualised employment relations.” (Mezzadri, 2012) In a study conducted by Rani and 
Unni in 2004, the formality of employment in this sector transitioned drastically during the structural 
adjustment period6, post-1990 from a highly formalized industry into a highly in-formalized one. 
(Rani and Unni, 2004. Mezzadri, 2012) These informalized patterns of production have led to mass 
exploitation, particularly of workers who fit into particular age, gender, caste and geographic 
conditions. As reported by the Rights, Education and Development Centre (READ) in Tamil Nadu, 
the majority of unskilled labor in the garment sector now comes from the Arunthathiyar community, 
otherwise known as the “untouchables” or the ‘Dalit.’ These terms refer to a particular caste of 
people living primarily in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sir Lanka and Bangladesh. Historically, Hindu 
culture was constructed into a four-fold caste system, (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Shurda.) The 
Dalit fall outside of these folds and as such, hold undesirable traditional occupations of waste / body 
disposal, and scavenging. Although the caste system in India has been outlawed, these former 
outsiders still face high levels of discrimination, low levels of education and extreme poverty. This 
reality makes them target populations for exploitation in the globalized export industry often 
administer through what’s known as Sumangali Schemes. (Samy. 2018)  
 
Sumangali Schemes 
 
Mr. Karuppusamy, Executive Director of READ (Rights, Education and Development) explains the 
process of the scheme as one that seeks to exploit the existing patriarchy and cast system of India in 
order to circumvent legally mandated labour regulations. Sumangali translates to “single girl 
becoming a respectable woman through marriage.” Its definition is consistent with its promise to 
provide poor rural women with enough money to afford a dowry upon completion of the contract. 
Sumangali agents will visit rural villages and proposition parents to relinquish their children targeting 
primarily young women 15-18 years old. The agents mislead parents by claiming that their factories 
have decent food, air conditioning, amenities, 8 hour working days and that they will be compensated 
with a lump sum (approximately Rs. 30,000) at the end of their (average) three year contract that can 
be used for a dowry. Girls are transported to the major textile exporting regions of Western Tamil 
                                                          
6 Structural adjustment is an economic development model that promoted export-led growth that is commonly associated 
with lowering / eliminating trade barriers including wages and labor standards. 
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Nadu; Tirupur, Dindigul, Coimbatore, Eeorde and/or Salem in what Mr. Karuppusamy refers to as 
“soft trafficking,” where these women have been reportedly kept in factory hostels employed as 
“apprentices.” Once under the supervision of the factory many of the promised working standards are 
not present. In a study of 220 working girls in Sumangali Schemes, it was found that 55% of 
interviewed workers in mills were child laborers (under 18)7, 81% were Dalits, 53% were required to 
work over 12 hours a day, 50% were hired through agents, 82% received less than minimum wage, 
47% of workers signed a contract with no understanding of what it said and the other 53% had not 
signed any formal contract whatsoever. There have been a number of testimonials reporting poor 
food quality, poor training, poor safety procedures, unhygienic conditions, compulsory overtime, lack 
of autonomy or freedom to leave the premises, heath problems including infertility, lung and 
respiratory conditions, and frequent sexual harassment often resulting in physical 
violence.(Karuppusamy. 2018) 
 
An Alternative Approach: Activist Social Enterprise 
 
Darryl had been devising new ways to teach undergraduates about co-operatives for 
years. Historically, much of the co-operative presence in Canada was found in the agricultural 
sector. With declining participation in agriculture (and with the increased prevalence of large 
operations, new co-ops were becoming a distant memory), many young people had limited 
opportunities for coming into contact with co-operatives. Both Darryl and his colleague J.J 
McMurtry were profoundly concerned that new generations were not seeing the co-operative model 
as a viable form of business. By 2005, in order to remedy this gap, the professors developed a stream 
in their program called the Social Economy which had a significant emphasis on co-operatives. In 
this program, they developed a placement course that they hoped might contribute 
to fostering a new generation of co-operative entrepreneurs. Despite this program’s relative success, 
Darryl and JJ struggled to find a nice range of local co-operatives that could become sites for 
experiential education. Moreover, their work with Fair Trade organizations highlighted to them the 
importance of co-operatives participating in international social economy value chains. For these 
reasons, Darryl and his colleagues felt that generating new co-operatives specifically designed to 
participate in new social economy value chains was the best course of action.   
                                                          
7 Describe child labor here  
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The GCC within Fairtrade 
In 2006, Darryl, J.J. McMurtry and Ananya Mukherejee-Reed received a research grant to investigate 
how to develop a new fair trade product. Their intention, to create a 100% social economy dominated 
value chain, needed to uphold the original intent of fair trade.  
 
When fair trade was introduced as an alternative to conventional trade it was largely characterized by 
short value chains run by very small social enterprises and NGOs. The original fair trader 
organization, such as Tradecraft, Oxfam and Ten Thousand Villages traded with small producer 
associations on the basis of solidarity rather than conventional market relationships. With the 
introduction of a formal certification system, the system began to accommodate larger corporate 
businesses in order to expand the market. (Reed, et al.) As more large corporate actors became 
certified they brought with them conventional business concerns (about maximizing profits) and 
practices (such as developing niche ethical markets) which change the nature of fair trade relations. 
Darryl and colleagues began publishing on the evolving state of fair trade with the objective of 
creating a normative framework to evaluate the different types of value chains that we now see. 
  
Type of Value Chain Level of Corporate Involvement Nature of Exchange 
Wholly social economy None Solidarity-based relations 
Social economy dominated Retail Solidarity-based relations 
Corporate dominated Retail, licensing Socially regulated market 
relations 
Wholly corporate Retail, licensing Socially regulated market 
relations 
 Four Variants of the Fair Trade Value Chain. Reed, et al. 
  
A wholly social economy value chain is one that involves all social economy actors that share the 
same principles of familiarity and long term relationships with the specific objective to revolutionize 
the nature of trade (on the basis of fair trade principles). The traders sell directly to consumers 
without the mediation of conventional, for-profit (investor-owned) firms. Social economy dominated 
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value chains are one where the primary licensee (the importer) is trading in solidarity relationships, 
but selling to conventional retailers that do not share the same organizational logic. An example of 
this would be the La Siembra Camino chocolate bars that trade in solidarity and have nation-wide 
distribution in most conventional grocery retailers. A corporate dominated relationship is one where a 
corporation, such as Mondelez and the Cadbury bar, buys cocoa from small producers (under 
minimum standards) but also produces chocolate along its regular supply chain and sells to 
conventional retailers. A wholly corporate chain involves a corporate licensee purchasing Fair Trade 
products from large estates (rather than small producers) and processing and distributing the final 
product along its regular supply chain. Darryl and colleagues hypothesize that the absence of a social 
economy buyer in the value chain de-politicizes the original intent of fair trade as a market 
intervention strategy, separating it from the broader social movement and leaving producers 
vulnerable to the same liberalized trade regimes that they were seeking to emancipate themselves 
from. 
 
In their analysis, Darryl and colleagues began to see that the more dominant corporate participation 
in fair trade became, the more tensions arose in the fair trade movement. As worlds collided and 
power dynamics shifted on the international fair trade stage, the original principles and values began 
to hold less sway. The pragmatists that were encouraging more corporate participation began to 
engage in trade-offs of values for market share. Darryl and colleagues identified two major processes 
of co-optation: 
Dilution 
The more managers from neoliberal corporations became involved in fair trade the more traditional 
business-case logic began to influence the certification. Fairtrade originally sought to support small 
scale agricultural producers and viewed the relationship as the primary source of value as opposed to 
being  “based upon convenience, necessity, and/or past history” (Reed. 2009) Corporate managers 
acting out of a narrowed cognitive frame tend to evaluate certifications on the basis of “how can this 
generate more revenue” or “how can this decrease my risk of losing revenue.” As such, some 
corporations have leveraged their position as a large licensee with Fairtrade International to attempt 
to lower their standards to ones that reflect more traditional value chains. (Reed. 2009) 
 Parallel Production 
Corporate managers also have tended to only certify one SKU of product in order to address the 
consumer demand and certify the rest of their products with either an in-house scheme or a less 
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stringent more corporate friendly scheme. This allows large corporations to demonstrate a 
commitment to fair trade principles when confronted with fair trade activists but keep the bulk of 
their production in traditional corporate-dominated value chains that reap the benefits of liberalized 
free trade. (Reed. 2009) 
Searching for Supply Chain Partners 
 
In 2005 the GCC, being comprised entirely of professors at this point, recognized that while they 
were proficient at research, they lacked the fundamental business skills that would be required to start 
and operate their own ventures. For this reason the team decided to engage in a partnership with the 
Sumac Co-op (an existing worker co-operative in Guelph). Under this agreement, the Sumac Co-op 
would handle the business ends while the researchers helped with supply chain development. Two 
trips to India were made, the first by Bill Barrett, worker owner in the Sumac Co-operative who 
visited and documented testimonials of women who had been widowed after an epidemic of farmer 
suicides. He also visited a number of cotton farmers, both ones that were fair trade and non-fair trade, 
as well as different co-operatives and factories that handled the various steps in the supply chain. 
During the second trip they traveled to Tirupur, Tamil Nadu to visit a number of garment factories, 
here they focused on one factory in particular, Assisi Garments.  
 
Assisi Garments Private Limited was developed by a group of Franciscan nuns that had been 
working in Kerala, India. Their primary objective was to help the poor and disadvantaged, 
specifically those with leprosy and later with general disabilities. (Reed, etal. 2012) The women that 
they were working with found it difficult to find employment after school due to their various 
disabilities, they also weren’t often in positions to get married. They established Assisi Garments in 
1994 with the idea that they would offer employment and training to women who had either hearing 
or visual impairments. The nuns later had to branch out to employ the rest of the potential work force 
in Tamil Nadu. (Reed, etal. 2012) Women could come to Assisi to gain skills, build income and 
would be paid a bonus of 10,000 Rs per year, of which the typically intention was to use those funds 
for dowry by the family. The sisters were aware of exploitative Sumangali schemes and the fact that 
the dowry practice had become illegal in India (though still widely used). Their decision to 
participate in similar practices came with the intention of providing true value for the family through 
more compassionate policies and formalizations. (Reed, etal. 2012) Many of the young women were 
meant to stay for five years, however more and more they were beginning to stay on with the 
company and receive other forms of training for higher skill / higher pay positions. Assisi seems like 
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an oasis of in a sea of chaos and uncertainty, the nuns greeted the researchers with open arms and 
surprising transparency, telling them all about their supply chains, costs, policies and impressive 
social account metrics.  
 
The organizational structure of the Sumac Co-operative was mirrored after Mondragon, a large 
worker co-operative in Spain that owned a number of businesses to service their membership. The 
Sumac Co-operative owns a coffee chain (Planet Bean) and workers employed at Planet Bean can 
work towards becoming members of the Sumac Co-operative, which in turn will entitle them to vote 
and share in the profits of the co-operative. Much like Mondragon, the Sumac Co-operative is 
designed to own as many businesses as its membership wishes with the idea that they would all be 
owned by the membership community. Operational micro-decisions about each business would be 
taken by the CEOs and workers of the business; however, larger macro-strategic decisions would be 
taken by the Sumac co-operative. (Barrett. 2018) In order to partner on this initiative with the GCC, 
the Sumac Co-operative incorporated a new company “Wear Fair” that would wholesale Fairtrade, 
Organic t-shirts with the assistance of the researchers who would contribute research support and 
help develop new supply chains. (Reed. 2018)  
 
Some key challenges began to complicate the partnership. First, the Sumac Co-operative preferred 
that they focused on raising enough capital to import a large amount of inventory that would reduce 
transaction costs and ensure that orders could be met before processing them. The GCC felt that it 
would be able to import smaller orders to fill demand and not worry as much about raising capital. 
Second, the Sumac Co-operative did not want to integrate into printing services and just wanted to 
supply wholesale, while the GCC felt that this was necessary to succeed. (Barrett. 2018) No 
resolution was found as they two entities struggled to attract debt-capital. As a result, the Wear Fair 
Company became dormant (although the two organizations do still occasionally work together in 
other informal ways to educate students about co-operatives and fair trade with guest lecturer visits 
and as participants of the larger fair trade movement.) 
 
Revitalization  
In 2015, Darryl and I had decided to revitalize the project under a new brand “Green Campus 
Cotton.” The Liberal Arts and Professional Studies faculty where Darryl and some other members of 
the board were employed had agreed to order 5000 shirts for all of their incoming LA&PS students. 
This order gave the new co-op the ability to process their first big sale, determine their product 
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economics and pull more stock through the shipment. It also gave them something that they would 
come to learn was very valuable: institutional legitimacy. The first obstacle however, that the co-
operative had to tackle was the issue of price.  
 
The Issue of Price  
Prices in the modern day garment industry have declined, which is extremely unusual considering 
that almost every other industry’s prices have increased. This phenomenon can be attributed to many 
factors: the solvency of the multi-fiber agreement, the prevalence of neo-liberal trade regimes, the 
globalization of production, and the emergence of fast fashion. To further make sense of this 
phenomenon however, we can also look from an organizational behaviour perspective, after all none 
of these elements in-and-of themselves directly explains why the entire industry’s prices have been 
dropping. This analysis suggests that the feedback loops between organizations and their behaviour 
have played a large role in fundamentally changing the nature of competition between garment 
importers.   
 
 
Figure 5. Changes in consumer pricing between 1986 – 2013. Baldwin. January 6 2017.  
 
In order to further explore this feed-back loop we can look at the fish bank simulation. One very 
popular economic simulation program used to illustrate the importance of prudency in MBA and 
environmental economics course work is the fish bank simulation. In this simulation, students are put 
into teams that manage their own simulated fishing companies. Here, students must balance efficient 
resource- use in a competitive field against the other teams. Their objectives are to maximize their 
own profits while simultaneously maintaining a healthy population of fish. If one team over fishes 
they gain significant profits but to the detriment of the common pool resource (the fish population). 
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The phenomenon of a team over-fishing is referred to as “shirking” of one’s responsibility to 
maintain a balance of that resource. When one team “shirks” it often begins a feedback loop that 
causes the other teams to overfish as well as the competitive field has changed into one where players 
feel they need to get as much as they can before the resource runs out. In order to maintain a health 
population of fish every team must act with prudency and concern for the greater good when 
fishing.8  
 
Think of the consumer dollars as a common pool resource and apparel companies as the “managers” 
of that resource. As fish are drawn to the lure so too are consumers to low prices.9 Low cost leaders 
adopt the strategy of driving down the costs of production so that they may better exploit this 
consumer behaviour. In this competitive field, if one company decides not to do this on principle, 
they take on the very real risk of losing a competitive edge. Low costs leaders will also engage in 
price wars where they drive the retail price down with the intention of pushing out an emerging 
competitor. In some cases, companies will even take a loss on the product and raise the prices back 
up to regular margins when the war has concluded. These feedback loops make it incredibly difficult 
to compromise on margins as it will make the company extremely vulnerable to competition when 
prices are depreciated overall. As stated by Guildan in a 2003 media release “our success depends on 
our continued and unwavering commitment to be the global low-cost producer of active wear and to 
constantly drive down our manufacturing cost structure” (MSN. Page 40) When one low cost leader 
gains an efficiency or externalizes the cost of production and lowers its retail price, it sets a new price 
precedent that other companies must conform to in order to attract consumers within the  
organizational fields that they share with that competitor. The Walmart effect is a perfect example of 
how the phenomenon happens. The size of Walmart’s purchasing power means that it can dictate the 
terms of a purchasing agreement with its wholesales as well as its employee compensation structure. 
This in turn forces other companies that serve a shared customer base with Walmart to drop their 
own prices and employee compensations as well in order to compete. (Investopia. 2018) Walmart is 
the quintessential low cost leader whose mere presence has changed the competitive field of most 
communities that it enters. (Fishman. 2006)   
                                                          
8 http://www.uvm.edu/~lpolya/ENVS%20295/Readings/Building%20the%20Fish%20Banks%20%20Model.pdf 
9 This is based off of the assumption of consumer irrationality.  
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Today’s garment industry is one where companies that have decided to “shirk” have changed the 
competitive field for almost everyone in the game. Externalizing the cost of production has become 
so woven into modern day supply chains that finding a clean supply chain10 is virtually impossible.  
 
The Co-op and Price 
Today the average garment retailer is estimated to add a 100%-350% mark-up on the wholesale price 
from the factory, however of course this differs between individual companies that adopt different 
pricing strategies and with a lack of data, true pricing models can be difficult to attain. (Kentin. 2010) 
Darryl having access to many administrative leaders on his campus was able to deduce that his 
Liberal Arts and Professional Studies faculty paid around $6 per shirt for their fall orientation order. 
This means that the wholesale price paid at minimum would be $3 with a 100% markup. In order for 
the co-operative to be able to supply t-shirts at a fair price it would need to figure out what its 
margins should be and how to increase the amount that universities were willing to go to in a 
competitive climate where prices are incredible deflated. The Liberal Arts and Professional Studies 
faculty would not be able to buy the GCC’s Fairtrade t-shirts for $6. They had convinced their 
finance department that their willingness to pay should be increased to at least $9.50 in order to 
reflect a truer cost of production.  
 
What the GCC’s costs were for the first order What the GCC would have had to buy shirts for 
to sell at $6 with a 100% mark up 
Cost per piece (CAD): 5.94 Cost per piece (CAD): 0.40 
Banking fees: .01 Banking fees: .01 
Freight:  1.29 Freight:  1.29 
GST: 0.31 GST: 0.31 
Customs / Import Duty: 0.96 Customs / Import Duty: 0.96 
Brokerage:  0.03 Brokerage:  0.03 
Fairtrade Licensee Fee: 0.09 Fairtrade Licensee Fee: Would not apply 
Total: 8.63 per piece Total:  3 per piece 
Retail Price:  9.5 Retail Price  6 
Margin: 10% Margin:  50% 
 
While larger, more established low costs leaders will have larger transactions and therefore smaller 
transaction costs per unit the above diagram shows what the GCC as a startup would have to buy 
                                                          
10 A supply chain that does not have modern day slavery, debt slavery, unfair compensation, excessive unpaid overtime, 
hazardous work, with no collective bargaining, etc.   
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shirts for if they wanted to adopt a low cost leader strategy. Taking lower margins however, will 
mean that the co-op as a wholesaler will have to sell more volume in order to compensate for the low 
margin and will not be able to offer discounts or sales prices as the wholesaler if they ever expect to 
hire any employees to run the business. In fact they will have to sell 11.1% more volume than if they 
had a 20% margin and 38.9% more volume then if they had a 25% margin in order to earn the same 
amount.11  
 
The co-operative tries to compensate for this by being a not-for profit with the intention to hire one 
Executive Director at $40,000 / year and to take a loan for $20,000 in order to buy printing 
equipment. This will result in a burn rate of approximately $4,200 per month which will require them 
to earn a minimum of $180,000 a year in net sales12 for five years to stay cash-flow positive.   
 
The co-operative has sold about $130,000 CAD from 2016-2018. This means that they will need to 
triple their current sales volume per year in order to sustain an employee. The co-operative can 
mitigate for these low margins with a variable costing structure and by adding margins onto their 
printing services. Of course, adding these services will incur capacity costs that also must be taken 
into consideration.  
 
Product Economics 
Landed costs average = $7.50 
# of Shirts Wholesale Costs (per unit) Margin 
>5 $14 52% 
5-19 $12.50 40% 
20-49 $12 36% 
50-199 $11.50 34% 
200-499 $11 31% 
500-999 $10.25 26% 
1000+ $9.5 21% 
   
 
The GCC as an Incubator  
                                                          
11 See appendix D  
12 This figures comes from a cash flow analysis of sales that are all sold with a 20% margin.  
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While relatively ad-hoc to this point in time, the Green Campus Co-operative resembles the 
beginnings of a unique campus incubator/accelerator model geared towards encouraging new fair 
trade and co-operative start-ups. Virtually every campus today has a campus-linked incubator, 
accelerator or entrepreneurial support center in it. An incubator focuses on early stage companies that 
require an immense amount of support to become self-sufficient. Incubators can take the form of 
workshops and mentorships that teach basic entrepreneurial skills like developing a product, building 
a value proposition and seeking seed investment. Accelerators are usually the next step providing 
more structure and typically work programmatically from a few weeks to a few months in length. 
Accelerators also typically provide co-working space, mentorship and the chance to be awarded start-
up capital. (Zajicek. 2017) The Green Campus Co-operative is a variation on these concepts with a 
number of distinct differences.  
 
First, the co-operative retains (at least partial) co-operative ownership of all their ventures as opposed 
to traditional campus incubator/accelerators that support external enterprises. The GCC also 
integrates governance processes and legal ownership through multi-stakeholder relationships. One of 
Darryl’s primary concerns was that the majority of students aren’t ready to start their own businesses 
straight out of university, nor can many of them afford to bootstrap one. (Reed. 2018) The second 
issue was that the economic pressures of funding and sustaining a new enterprise cause the 
entrepreneur to pursue paths of least resistance. This makes developing redistribution models like fair 
trade (that may create a competitive disadvantage in the market place) less attractive options.  
 
The second is the exclusivity of nonprofit, co-operative models. This exclusivity makes sense in 
some contexts for ownership as some of the businesses are owned collectively by entire faculties 
through their professional associations. The not for profit, co-operative model also limits the types of 
funding that the start-ups can attract specifically preventing venture capital expectations to cause 
mission drift. (Reed. 2018)13 Finally it allows the co-operatives to amass under an unofficial 
federated umbrella, creating networks of strong and loose ties that can potentially resource-share and 
rally together in movement building. (Hopper. 2018)  
 
                                                          
13 Not for profit, co-operative status helps the board of directors (comprised entirely of students and faculty) to avoid 
potential conflicts of interest that may ensue from directing research towards entrepreneurial projects Some professors 
have had to step away from the co-operative as they’ve ascended into higher-level administrative roles. (McMurty. 2018)  
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The third difference is the politicization of the co-operatives and the strong emphasis on being 
mission-centric. Both of the co-operative businesses have align missions of local, organic and fair 
trade practices. (Reed. 2018, Russo. 2018) They are designed to prioritize and explore the 
advancement of their missions in tandem with revenue generation. Mission and revenue creation 
must be in “lock step” meaning that they are interdependent; one cannot exist without the other.  
 
Finally, the co-operatives provide a variety of experiential education opportunities that are 
administered through a variety of different programs (not just business and entrepreneurship.) All of 
these practices are formalized by their three strategic pillars.  
 
• To promote sustainable consumption and production on campuses (via fair trade) 
• To promote the co-operative business model  
• To provide experiential education opportunities for students on campus (Green Campus Co-
operative. 2018)  
 
The GCC as a Co-op 
While Darryl and colleagues were intent on creating a new fair trade value chain they were also very 
interested in incubating new co-operatives to teach and encourage students to learn about co-
operative businesses. The board was intended to be a working board in which those members would 
act as the collective entrepreneurs for the development of new co-ops. They wanted students to not 
set up their own businesses, but to rather to learn how a new business gets set-up within a relatively 
sheltered environment (not having to put in capital, etc.)  The board had 9 seats of which 5 are 
designated for professors and 4 for students; however, students currently make up the majority of the 
seats. There were a few committees, marketing and events, sustainability and finance that were 
designed to take responsibility for the various elements of the co-operatives business development 
that would be led by the committee chair. Four past student board members were interviewed two of 
which served six years terms and the rest serving less than a one-year term thus far. For most of the 
students this was their first board experience as well as first co-operative business experience. 
Respondents all claimed that their time working with the GCC was a positive experience and some of 
them have sought our more board work in the broader co-operative sector upon completing their 
term. Other respondents noted that they felt like they were unable to engage in the short-term goals of 
the co-operative as opportunities would come and go without their knowledge. Many respondents 
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noted that they enjoyed working with external stakeholder (like the Sumac Co-operative) and they 
wish they could do it more. Some board members noted however that they do not fully understand 
the structure of the co-operative, nor the scope of their role. (Interviews with micro-stakeholders. 
2018). 
 
Limitations 
 
While the operational board structure of the GCC is a unique and distinctive design, it is difficult to 
execute and faces many challenges. First, the board is the primary decision making body for the 
operations of the enterprise but involves a number of students that often lack previous board 
experience. Without a sophisticated board training process students may feel unprepared or 
intimidated to challenge the more experienced members making them susceptible to various 
cognitive biases like group think or confirmatory bias. An interesting parallel model to the GCC is 
the Guelph Campus Co-op whose commercial objectives are to sell textbooks and offer various 
student housing projects through a similar consumer co-op mode. The staff at all of the Guelph 
Campus Co-op’s businesses is made up of hired professionals that are responsible for training the 
board. (Barrett. 2018) Since meso stakeholder respondents have expressed their interest in a more 
formalized board training process this model may prove to be an interesting concept to draw insights 
from. One final sometimes confusing element of the GCC’s cotton initiative is identifying who the 
membership is. Technically as a consumer co-operative it would be required that the customers 
would be the membership and therefore become the owners of the business, however this is not the 
case with the GCC. This unclear membership makes it difficult to understand the utility of the co-
operative model and as a result to teach the co-operative model through praxis. The GCC will have to 
re-think their membership structure to clarify the utility of their co-operative model and meet the 
legal requirement of a consumer co-operative business. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The Green Campus Co-operative is taking on a very ambition task. Although they have no major 
dominating competitors, they operate in a fully saturated market, a market where price precedents 
have been driven down to unsustainable levels. To succeed, the co-op will need to rethink many 
aspects of their industry; they will need to battle with the paradoxical nature of the pricing, find 
reliable and sustainable long-term supply chain partners and engage in activism with relevant 
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stakeholders that share their vision and praxis. It will be very interesting to see how the co-op is able 
to navigate their way through the apparel industry in Canada. I am sure their process will make for 
more interesting research in the future as more data is collected. 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
A Normative Analysis: Green Campus Cooperative and Institutional Theory 
  
Like all businesses the GCC exists within an organizational 
field and this field is subject to “normal” patterns of 
behaviour. As organizational theory would suggest these 
patterns of behaviour are to varying degrees affected by the 
normative, coercive and mimetic pressures that seek to 
influence them. Each of these forces apply different leverage 
points that the co-operative can use to advance their mission 
of fair trade, local and organic purchasing on campus. 
 
Mimetic Pressure: 
The first problem that campus activists were facing when thinking about how to integrate Fairtrade 
and Organic Certified cotton apparel into Canadian Universities was the simple fact that no 
businesses were supplying it. Mimetic isomorphism is the tendency for an organization to copy 
another organization’s strategy because they see value in it. For this reason, providing a product 
alternative is a key strategy not just for availability, but also to demonstrate proof of concept for 
Fairtrade, Organic garments in the broader business environment and provide an example for which 
others can copy. As the Green Campus Cotton can sell to more institutional buyers, the more they 
will be able to validate a market demand for Fairtrade and Organic Certifications. 
 
Challenges 
As an activist social enterprise that champions a mission and a product / service, the Green Campus 
Cooperative faces a unique paradox. While one objective is to have more companies adopt Fairtrade 
and Organic Certification, simultaneously the brand value derived from those certifications is the 
main differentiation point for the co-operative. This paradoxical reality is a large theme for an activist 
social emprise concerned with systems-change. 
 
Mimetic
CoerciveNormative
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If the Green Campus Co-operative gains market validation for Fairtrade, Organic cotton then other 
larger traditional corporations may decide to certify a small portion of the products as Fairtrade to 
capture the niche-market. To prepare for this eventuality, the Green Campus Co-operative will have 
to do a very thorough job educating their customers and nurturing their relationship with champions 
that share the vision of fair trade. They will need to develop strong social capital relations that can 
preserve their markets and ensure that the quality of their products and services are on-par with 
traditional brands.  
 
Normative pressure 
Normative pressure refers to the professionalization of organizations and the internal cultural 
dynamics that result. There are no formal business programs at universities that teach redistribution 
as a primary driver for creating a fairer global trade system. In fact, the concept of fair trade is often 
seen as a byproduct of international development, not business. Many proponents of fair trade 
however (producers included), do not consider the system to be a development model, but rather an 
alternative trade system that is entirely propelled through business transactions. As a result, business 
students entering the professional world are not introduced to the concept of redistribution and are 
actively discouraged from supporting these methods in prominent research like Creating Shared 
Value by Porter and Kramer (due to their perceived competitive restraints). The GCC’s experiential 
education program can actively seek to professionalize students to work in fair trade businesses and 
can produce academic business-centric research about fair trade value chains. The co-operative can 
also work with existing fair trade programs like the Canadian Fair Trade Network origin trip program 
to send students to fair trade producer co-operatives as part of their educational experience and 
support the education of administrations bodies to understand the benefits of fair trade. They can also 
support (through social capital relationships) other organizations that seek to change the normative 
pressures on business managers.  
 
Coercive pressure 
Coercive pressure, being the formal rules that govern an organization behavior, also provide a good 
leverage point for the co-operative to gain a competitive advantage. The Canadian Fair Trade 
Network has been running their fair trade designation program since 2012 and has thus far designated 
32 campuses under their program. These designations require that all food service locations offer 
Fairtrade Certified coffee, at least 3 Fairtrade Certified teas and one Fairtrade Certified chocolate bar. 
It also requires the formation of an ongoing steering committee that must report annually on their 
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 Impacts
Adoption of fair trade by other actors
Fair trade standards are institutionally recognized 
and championed
New competitive environment for institutional 
sellers
Outcomes
Large Canadian market for fair trade cotton
Informed and impactful consumer base / new 
wave of fair trade entrepreneurs 
Fair trade procurement embedded in institutions 
Outputs
Expanded availability of fair trade garments in 
Canada
Build the consumer base for fair trade garments / 
build pipeline for fair trade business talent
Increased pressure on institutions to adopt fair 
trade mission
Intervention / Inputs
Provide an ethical alternative to buy promotional 
garments
Fair Trade- centric experiential education program
Support the fair trade programs movement 
(financially)
Leverage Points
Mimetic Normative Coercive
efforts to increase product availability and monitoring the food service departments. (CFTN. 2018) 
When the designation program first began with the first certified campus (the University of British 
Columbia), it took several years to gain traction. It wasn’t until 2015 that the program began to 
expand rapidly now with 32 designated universities and a steering committee on virtually every 
campus across Canada. (McHugh. 2018) Due to its success and demand from top performing 
campuses the CFTN has developed new tiers of designation; silver and gold. In the gold designation 
each campus needs to have at least one Fairtrade Certified cotton product available. This compliance 
measure helps incentivize some university bookstores to seek out the co-operative’s goods. Further 
development of this program could in time help to change the competitive environment on campuses. 
If all cotton products were required to be Fairtrade Certified then any emerging competitor that 
wanted to sell on campuses would have to compete not just economically, but also within the co-
operative’s social and environmental mission. Universities are a very large client group for 
promotional materials, with governments, nonprofits and public institutions (including universities) 
holding 9.2% of a $1.9 billion dollar industry in Canada. (IBIS. 2018). In an opened market the 
cooperative is disadvantaged; they will have to sell more volume to make up for their smaller 
margins compared to their competition. In this hypothetical scenario however, there would be no 
room for cost leaders to “shirk” and take advantage of an externalized cost of production, they would 
have to pay a Fairtrade minimum price leaving only differentiation strategies as the main source for 
competitive advantage. 
 
Suggestions:   
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The Green Campus Co-operative itself should institutionalize the principles and theory of 
institutional entrepreneurship and engage its strategy through that methodology. It should give 
priority to building out its commercial solution so that it may service the demand for Fairtrade 
Certified cotton, it should take advantage of its position on a university campus to embed fair trade 
education into curriculum, and it should actively seek to change the nature of competition in its 
primary market: the university campus by supporting the Fairtrade Campus designation program. By 
embracing these three pillars the co-operative is not only setting itself up for success, but also 
influencing the environment around it to support its mission. Above is a sample table for a theory of 
change that the co-operative can use as a guideline. 
 
Normative Analysis: Green Campus Co-operative and Cognitive Frames Theory 
 
A very large component of the Green Campus Co-operative’s mandate is to provide experiential 
education programs to students. This gives the co-operative an opportunity to allow students to 
explore business sustainability solutions that embrace trade-offs. Thus far the GCC educational 
program has lacked structure and focus as the uncertain hustle and bustle of creating new business 
has made it a challenging space to create a program within and with limited capacity. Now that the 
co-operative has established two primary businesses its experiential educational program has space to 
evolve.  
 
Reflecting on the inferences derived from cognitive frames theory it can be understood that the 
widely accepted understanding of a sustainability strategy in business is one that emphasizes a win-
win-win model of financial social and environmental success. This cognitive frame of thinking is 
dangerous as it limits the scope of possible solution building to ones that have a clear business case. 
As a result, issues like modern day slavery, volatile commodity markets and sweatshops that do not 
have a clear business case solution will often be overlooked or miss-diagnosed. The Green Campus 
Co-operative should take advantage of its resources, location and mandate to provide experiential 
education as an opportunity to provide students with an environment that allows for paradoxical 
thinking. Placement students are presented with complex social and environmental problems when 
working with the GCC and these problems can be diagnosed with solutions that embrace then 
tensions between business and society. Students can scan problems with the input of a variety of 
stakeholders and should be encouraged to challenge their own assumptions or confirmatory biases. 
When collecting information, the students should be encouraged not to seek out definitive answers 
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but rather multiple paths that have been well researched. Finally, the students can and should be 
encouraged to test new theories, ideas or variations that may fall outside of typical business case 
frameworks utilizing information from interdisciplinary backgrounds. One potential assignment for 
an experiential education student at the et al (the café / pub) may look at a particular dish and 
research the social and environmental ramifications or benefits of each ingredient, then weigh that 
through a cost / benefit analysis to determine how financial feasible it is and if they can stomach any 
potential trade-offs. Students can do carbon accounting modeling around ingredients or t-shirts that 
can be used to articulate impact to membership and then test how those metrics affect purchasing 
habits by running trials through the bar. These are but a few examples of opportunities that this 
model affords students for exploration as the enterprises principle mandate allows them to focus on 
aspects of the business that may not have obvious financial benefits. 
 
Although the co-operative is fulfilling its mandate to provide experiential education to students, the 
core objectives of providing co-operative and fair trade education remains unclear. The experiential 
education within the GCC can be provided in two different manners, one, education on paradoxical 
decision making with the placement students and two, co-operative governance for those students 
that run for a board position. There is no shortage of students willing to take a placement on campus, 
and the co-op will have some work to do in the upcoming year to design an experience that is 
meaningful to both the student and the movement. 
 
A Normative Analysis: Green Campus Co-operative and Social Capital 
 
The Green Campus Co-operative is a small enterprise that faces many unique growth challenges, one 
because of its co-operative mode, which has capital raise restrictions. Two, it buys on fair trade 
terms, meaning that they have to pay for orders up-front and those costs will vary depending on the 
market price for cotton and the US dollar. They also pay a quality differential for Organic cotton and 
have students on their board that lack practical business experience. Finally, they are bootstrapped 
and at capacity with one full time employee who needs to handle all of the operations of the business 
with a low margin and high volume model. This employee will have to sell large amounts of clothing 
while simultaneously growing the organization’s social capital and facilitating placement students 
experiential education. While this may seem overwhelming, the co-operative also has a number of 
advantages due it is mission primacy and positioning. First the co-op has a number of faculty board 
members who specialize in many different aspects that relate to the co-op (supply chain, business, 
sustainability, food systems, etc.) These individual can lend both intellectual capital and social capital 
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by providing expert information and linking the co-ops to their own broader networks. Secondly, the 
co-operative’s student board members eventually graduate and go on to work with other 
organizations that can also build networks and social capital. In fact, there are many ways in which 
the GCC can leverage its unique model to build its intellectual, financial and structural social capital. 
 
Cognitive Social Capital 
By virtue of being a co-operative, academic and a fair trade social enterprise, the GCC has many 
opportunities for values alignment. When the first Liberal Art’s and Professional Studies order was 
placed the co-operative sent a press releases to its NGO network (that shared its core-values of fair 
trade and development) (e.g. Fairtrade Canada, the CFTN, Fair Trade Toronto, The Ontario Council 
for International Co-operative and CASC) These organizations then provided free advertisement that 
the co-op was able to relay back to the faculty, thus bridging a connection between the customer and 
civic engagement. By leveraging this press from its NGO network it is able to demonstrate added 
value to its customer by rewarding the aspects of its transactions that fulfill the GCCs core mission. 
The GCC also provides experiential education opportunities that many faculties are interested in 
developing for their students. In doing this, the GCC’s identity is becoming more closely relatable to 
its core customer as the values alignments of education can be made on top of fair trade, organic 
supply chains. This increases the likelihood for building more network connections outside of the 
transaction with a target customer. The GCC can also appeal to other co-operatives to buy from them, 
(as they will likely be more receptive to the GCC’s relatable model.)  
 
The GCC will begin to encounter cognitive barriers as it tries to move into more mainstream markets 
(events, corporate workplaces, etc.) If the co-op desires to engage with these prospects, in order to 
leverage cognitive social capital it will have to get creative with its value proposition by packaging it 
with things that are material for that business or event.  
 
Structural Social Capital 
The GCC benefits from structural social capital in many ways. Its office space was given free of 
charge by the Liberal Arts and Professional Studies faculty (LA&PS) at York University and the co-
op retains insider industry knowledge from York’s Bookstore. Board members sit on a number of 
other boards including Fairtrade Canada, The Canadian Association for the Study of Co-operatives, 
the Canadian Fair Trade Network, Fair Trade Toronto, Karma Co-op and many others. This 
structural alignment grants the co-op intellectual resources as other members of those boards are 
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often key stakeholders in particular target markets and can make referrals, introductions or lend 
operational knowledge. The co-operative’s partnership in the et al faculty and grad student lounge 
and café has also opened up doors for the GCC to gain access to other individuals who have a values 
alignment with their core mission and the respective organizations that they collaborate with. 
Conclusion  
 
This paper has explored the unique case of the Green Campus Co-operative that seeks to develop 
core competencies in both business and activism. It suggests that while the GCC is on the surface a 
commercial enterprise its core objective is to change the institutional norms and behaviors of the 
actors within its organization field. This means increasing its buyers’ willingness to pay by educating 
them about the social and environmental benefits of Fairtade, Organic Certified supply chains. It 
means changing the competitive field in its core market (primarily university campuses and cities) to 
one in which social and environmental considerations have a competitive advantage over profit 
maximization. To do this the GCC must participate in the fair trade programs to ratchet up 
procurement standards on campuses and in towns using the principles of coercive isomorphism. The 
paper also suggests that the GCC needs to embrace the principles of normative isomorphism by 
training students to embrace the trade-offs between economic, social and environmental progress. In 
doing this, their students will not only potentially become paradoxical thinkers, but they will become 
educated in the principles of institutional entrepreneurship and can replicate activist social 
entrepreneurship (or intra-preneurship) in their future careers. Finally, the importance of building 
social capital and developing dense networks of strong and loose ties that share common vision and 
praxis was discussed. This ensures that it’s radical vision of fair trade is upheld within its own 
movement and I have proposed a number of ways in which it can do that. 
 
So, to re-visit our introduction, who is to blame? 
 
In a perfect world, if the conditions of the free market were present, then theoretically each product 
sold on our shelves would reflect a perfect cost to create it. This fundamental economic assumption is 
the core of decades of economic theory that has enlightened policies, business transactions and global 
economic flows of capital. For all members of our global economic system to prosper let’s start with 
this fundamental building block: striving to reach a perfect cost to be reflected in our pricing. We 
should blame any entity that supports a system that would exploit this concept, to “shirk” and gain an 
unfair comparative advantage by driving its externalized costs of production onto any other member 
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of the value chain. We should blame firms that try to control market prices through oligopolies and 
use that power to bankrupt competitors by locking them into impossible pricing wars. We should 
strive to minimize asymmetric information flow to consumers and encourage competition that 
reinforces rational behavior on the part of business managers. Finally, we should seek out meaningful 
missions that treat the systemic root-causes of the problems we want to correct with our social 
enterprises. Finally, we should fight through organizational conflicts when SEs are absorbed by 
larger entities, or when their visions are challenged by well-resourced opponents. 
 
Next to only oil, the global garment industry is the second highest polluter on earth. (Morgan. 2015) 
Cotton uses 25% of all insecticides and 10% of all pesticides in a world that is now consuming 400% 
more clothing than only two decades ago. (Morgan. 2015) There are approximately 40 million 
garments workers in the world today, of which 85% are women. (Morgan. 2015) Among these 
workers there are more slaves working in bonded labor now that during any other point in history. 
(Wishing Step. 2017) 
 
We can do better, one activist social enterprise at a time. 
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Appendix  
 
Appendix A: Interview Guide  
 
 
 Institutional Entrepreneurship: A Case Study of the Green Campus Co-operative.  
  
Abstract:  
This action research case study will explore the Green Campus Co-operative’s unique hybrid structure (as a 
not-for profit co-operative) and its location within a university campus to explore if it is well equipped to 
address industries that have become subject to market-failure. The comparison will measure this impact 
through selected institutional entrepreneurship frameworks and will focus on the GCC’s ability maximize its 
own mission. It will be specifically looking at the co-operative’s attempt to actively engage with and change 
the practices, policies and strategies of the stakeholders that it interacts with and encourage them to adopt the 
enterprise’s social mission of fair trade.  
 
Method:  
A participatory action research case study approach was chosen to identify how the Green Campus Co-
operative has been able to leverage institutional entrepreneurship to advance their mission of fair trade. I have 
adapted the characteristics of action research in order to address my familiarity and participation in the project 
and applied them to a case study method 
so I can isolate and understand to some degree how the mission of fair trade has been diffused through the  
 
broader business environment surrounding the cooperative.  
 
Participants will be asked a series of questions that relate to their experiences with either the Green Campus 
Cooperative and/or the Canadian Fair Trade Network / Fairtrade Canada towns, campus, workplace, events, 
faith groups, schools campaigns. It will be coded and analyzed through selected isomorphic indicators, 
(coercive, mimetic, and normative.)  
 
Sample Question(s):  
1. Please describe your experience with the Green Campus Co-operative  
2. Has your knowledge of fair trade increased since working with the Green Campus Co-operative?  
3. How has the broader business environment changed over your career with regards to its embrace of fair 
trade  
4. What tools have you observed over the course of your career that has (in your opinion) 
legitimized the fair trade movement in terms of (regulation, societal acceptance, vendor acceptance, university 
acceptance)  
5. Have you started noticing other fair trade products since working with the Green Campus Co-operative?  
6. (In your opinion) How has your institution changed since becoming fair trade designated?  
 
Conflicts of interest:  
The research declares no conflict of interest.  
 
Assessment of Risks:  
There are no perceived significant risks to participation in this study.  
 
Assessment of Benefits:
Participants from various stakeholder groups will be able to use this framework for analysis in their ongoing 
attempts to peruse their various mission(s). It will also provide a monitoring and evaluation framework for the 
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Green Campus Cooperative to measure its ongoing attempts to correct the market failure that it seeks to 
address by advancing its mission of fair trade. Study Overview  
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Appendix B: Price Discount Calculator  
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